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Abstract 
 
For a given technology, two ways are available to achieve low polluting emissions: reducing 
production per capita or reducing population size. This paper insists on the tension between the 
former and the latter. Controlling pollution either through Pigovian taxes or through tradable 
quotas schemes encourages agents to shift away from production to tax free activities such as 
procreation and leisure. This natalist bias will deteriorate the environment further, entailing the 
need to impose ever more stringent pollution rights per person. However, this will in turn 
gradually impoverish the successive generations: population will tend to increase further and 
production per capita to decrease as the generations pass. One possible solution consists in 
capping population too. 
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1 Introduction
Pollution control can be justied on both eciency and fairness grounds. Under a Kyoto type
of regime, a key motivation for capping greenhouse gas emissions arises from a concern for
future generations. The aim is to make sure that the climatic conditions they will experience
either be not worse than ours or, at the very least, don't prevent them from leading a decent
life. Article 2 of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol states that it aims at the
stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.
Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sucient to allow ecosys-
tems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is
not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable
manner.
The assumption is thus that people in the future will be better o, climatically speaking,
if we cap emissions from now on, than under a business as usual scenario. This is a very
plausible claim. And yet, it generates concerns.
One worry has to do with the opportunity cost for today's poor of such pollution control.
The worry we are going to deal with here is the reverse one. It is not so much that pollution
control may impoverish today's poor if certain conditions are met. It is rather that it may
impoverish future generations too, including their poorest members. Now, the mechanism
through which future generations might become poorer as a result of pollution control rests on
the demographic impact of the latter. In general, the literature in climate economics tends
to operate under the assumption that demographics is exogenous (adopting for example
global population size projections made by major demographic institutions). One exception
consists in the attempt to connect demographics with the choice of allocation rule of tradable
quotas. Consider the following two quotes as illustrations:
"The major objections to [per capita entitlements] are based partly on ethi-
cal and practical 'comparable-burden' type arguments (since it would imply a
huge adjustment burden on industrialized countries, to which they are unlikely
to agree), and partly on grounds of concern that such allocation might 'reward'
population and population growth. Proponents tend to argue that any such eect
is negligible compared to other factors inuencing population; but to avoid any
inducement to population growth, Grubb suggests that the population measure
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should be restricted to population above a certain age. (. . . ) Grubb et al. note
a wider range of possibilities for avoiding any incentive to population growth,
including 'lagged' allocation (related to population a xed period earlier); appor-
tionment to a xed historical date; or the inclusion of an explicit term related
inversely to population growth rate" (Grubb (1995): 485-486).
If we agree that emissions allocations should be based on numbers of people,
we eectively encourage something which compounds our problems on Earth:
population growth. Solutions have been suggested; in particular, we might tie
allocations to population gures for a specic time. Singer, for example, argues
that per capita allocations should be based on estimates of a country's population
in the future, to avoid penalizing countries with young populations. (Garvey
(2008): 218).
Although none of these quotes is entirely explicit about the mechanism through which per
capita allocation incentivizes population growth, one may assume that what these two au-
thors have in mind is the following idea: under a fully or partly population-based allocation
rule of pollution rights, countries are happy with letting their population grow because this
will positively impact on their relative share in the quota allocation at the next period. This
share preservation/increase motive can be one incentive for population growth. Grubb is
probably right: if this is what actually drives the natalist eect, it is likely to remain negli-
gible, as population growth may also entail costs likely to more than compensate the value
of getting extra emission entitlements.
The mechanism we have in mind diers from the share reservation/increase motive. More-
over, its impact is likely to be much more signicant. Our starting point is that, when there
is only one production sector, capping emissions entails capping production. We will show
that this generates a shift from production to other activities, especially procreation. It
is this shift from production to reproduction that will generate the demographic impact of
capping emissions. Note that in this case, what drives the natalist eect does not directly
have to do with the allocation formula. It rather has to do more directly with the very
existence of a cap.
As mentioned above, endogenous responses of population have been neglected so far in
environmental economics. The main contribution of our paper is accordingly to provide a
framework where demography reacts to pollution control. In order to properly focus on that
aspect, we simplify matters with regard to technology, and more specically, to its degree
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of eco-eciency. We keep it exogenous. This does not need to imply that technology is
constant, but rather that technological progress does not depend on the conducted policy.
One may object that assuming exogenous technology is far fetched. Admittedly, a portion
of technical change is endogenous. However, the empirical literature suggests that this
portion is limited.
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Moreover, there is a second way in which our assumption is realistic:
in cases such as climate change, the scale of environment-saving improvements required to
stabilize pollution is daunting, at least in the medium-run. Even fully endogenous and highly
responsive technology may therefore not suce.
The essential ingredients of the model are as follows. Individuals allocate their time across
three activities: production, leisure, and procreation. Each of these concepts has a specic
meaning. Production refers to the time spent on manufacturing consumption and invest-
ment goods with an autonomous technology. Leisure involves non-market and emission free
activities, such as chatting with friends, sleeping, sweeping the oor,... but could also be
extended to include time spent on eco-friendly production activities.
2
Procreation refers to
the time spent on child rearing by parents.
Substitution of procreation for production is at the heart of this paper. It occurs as soon as
rearing children takes time
3
and is sensitive to the relative return of spending time on this or
other activities. Various factors can aect this relative return: parents' income (Becker and
Lewis 1973), child mortality (Bar and Leukhina (2010) and Doepke (2005)), the absence of
formal old age support schemes (Ehrlich and Lui 1991), cultural norms (Princeton European
Fertility Project), the importance of increasing the relative power of one's community (see
Toft (2002) and de la Croix and Dottori (2008)), etc. In this paper we concentrate on the
rst of these factors. Becker and Lewis (1973) stress that the wage of the parents is part
of the opportunity cost of having children. A rise in parents wage leads to a substitution
of production for procreation, and to drop of fertility. Such a mechanism is seen by many
economists as a key explanation of the demographic transition (for a recent critical survey
see Jones, Schoonbroodt, and Tertilt (2010)). If wages are so important for fertility out-
1
The impact of environmental prices and policy on technological choice by rms has been studied by
many. It seems that while some innovation was responsive to energy price changes, a sizable portion of
eciency improvements were still autonomous (see Newell, Jae, and Stavins (1999)). In addition, although
environmental taxes reduce pollution by encouraging the development of new technologies, simply relying
on technological change as a panacea for environmental problems is not enough (see Popp (2002)).
2
Leisure is a non essential ingredient of the model. Its inclusion ensures the robustness of the results to
the existence of a diversity of activities allowing at every moment in time to shift from eco-ecient activities
to less eco-intensive ones.
3
More precisely, the key assumption is that time costs is much more signicant than goods costs in the
case of child rearing. In the model, we abstract from goods costs, which does not impact on our results as
long as such costs remain relatively smaller.
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comes, taxes on wages are relevant too. Pollution control policy, either explicitly through a
Pigovian tax, or implicitly through a tradable quota scheme, implies a drop in the net wage
of those working in the nal good sector. For households, production becomes relatively
more expensive through the conjunction of the tax resulting from the cap and the absence
of such a tax on procreation and leisure. Agents then tend to substitute reproduction and
leisure to production. As a result, unless substitution is exclusively of a production - leisure
type, population will tend to increase and production per worker to decrease.
How strong is this substitution eect? Many empirical studies show that fertility is negatively
related to mothers' wages or education.
4
This tends to conrm that opportunity costs such
as women's income are essential to determine fertility. However, even if this mechanism were
weak it would not matter much for our purpose. This is because our time horizon is long.
The cumulative impact on population of even a weak substitution eect is indeed likely to
be signicant.
When, in addition to choosing the number of children, parents also choose the quality of
these children, capping pollution will have additional eects. Quality of children amounts
to future productivity and is the result of investment in education, health etc. which we
distinguish from mere child rearing. Many authors rely on the notion of a quantity-quality
tradeo, introduced by Becker (1960), to explain the rise in education and the fertility decline
during the demographic transition: as the economy grows and wages rise the opportunity
cost of child rearing increases. At the same time, rising income implies that investment
in education becomes more aordable. Parents therefore substitute child quality for child
quantity, and decide to have smaller families with better education (see e.g. Doepke (2004)).
In the case of environmental policy, this mechanism goes in the opposite direction. Taxing
production lowers the wages, decreases the opportunity cost of raising children but increases
the cost of education relative to the wage. Parents would therefore substitute child quantity
for child quality, and decide to have larger and less educated families. In the case of develop-
ing countries in the middle of their demographic transition, taxing pollution, and therefore
production and income, is thus expected to delay the drop in fertility and the rise in educa-
tion, going in the opposite direction to what is suggested in the literature, i.e., taxing birth
and subsidizing education (Fan and Stark (2008), Shi and Zhang (2009)).
In Section 2 we introduce pollution dynamics into a standard model of fertility with a
quality-quantity tradeo. In Section 3 we set a pollution cap and analyze the dynamics of
population and income under such a policy. A numerical experiment is provided in Section 4
4
For example, Fernández and Fogli (2006) for migrants in the US Deb and Rosati (2004) for India and
Baudin (2009) for France.
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aimed at illustrating and quantifying the main eects derived in the previous sections. The
last section concludes.
2 The Benchmark Model
Time is discrete and goes from 0 to innity. Each individual only lives for two periods:
childhood and (active) adulthood. We consider a closed economy, possibly the whole Earth,
endowed with a certain quantity of land L, having an initial level of human capital per person
k0, an adult population size N0, and an initial pollution level P−1. We rst describe how
pollution is generated. Then we consider the household maximization problem and, nally,
the implied aggregate dynamics.
2.1 Production and Pollution
At a given time, for a given technology, polluting emissions Et are proportional to total
output Yt:
Et = atYt
Variable at represents the pollution coecient, i.e. the degree to which production generates
polluting emissions. Total output is itself the product of adult population size Nt and
production per person yt:
Et = atNtyt
This equation is known in the literature as the Kaya identity. If Et is measured in tons
of CO2, then at would be tons of CO2 per dollar produced. The stock of pollution St
accumulates according to:
St = Ψ(St−1, Et), ∀t ∈ N.
The function Ψ(.) takes dierent forms in the literature.5 Figure 1 displays a map of iso-
pollution curves. Each curve represents a constant pollution level in the plane population ×
income per person. As we follow the curve towards the right, income per person decreases
and population increases, pollution remaining constant. In order to move from one iso-
pollution curve to another with lower level of emissions, one may of course lower production
5
See for example John and Pecchenino (1994) where pollution is the inverse of an environment variable
which accumulates like capital, assuming some positive degradation rate, i.e., the share of past pollution
St−1 that has been absorbed by the environment. In Howarth (1998), a world temperature variable is like
pollution here and depends on the past emissions.
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per capita and/or lower population size; however, one could even increase any of the two if
the other gets reduced strongly enough.
Income
per cap.
Population
Iso-pollution loci
Figure 1: Map of Iso-pollution Curves
Over time, the map can change. Two factors aect the position of the curves. On the one
hand, technical progress allowing to produce the same amount with a cleaner technology
and lower emissions (for example through higher energy eciency) shifts the iso-pollution
curves to the North-East. Environmental eciency decreases the pollution coecient at. On
the other hand, if there is more pollution accumulated in the past (St−1), the iso-pollution
curves of today will shift to the South-West. Figure 2 represents these two possible shifts.
Income
per cap.
Population
technical progress
pollution saving
Accumulated
past pollution
Figure 2: Shifts over Time of one Iso-pollution Curve
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2.2 Households
At each date t, there is a new adult generation of size Nt deriving utility from consumption ct,
leisure `t, number of children nt, and quality of the children kt+1, as measured by their future
human capital. Households are homogeneous. We assume a logarithmic utility function
u(ct, `t, nt, kt+1) = ln ct + ϕ ln `t + γ ln(ntkt+1),
with ϕ, γ ∈ R+. Parameter ϕ is the taste for leisure. Parameter γ is the altruism factor.
Parents care both about child quantity nt and quality kt+1, as measured by the human capital
provided to them. Notice that parents do not care about their children utility, as it would
be the case with dynastic altruism. Our formulation of altruism is referred in the literature
as joy-of-giving (or warm glove), because parents have a taste for giving (see e.g. Andreoni
(1989)). As our aim here is not to assess how agents should behave, impure altruism seems
an acceptable assumption as a mean to obtain clearcut analytical results.
The choice of a logarithmic utility function is defended by Prescott (1986) on the grounds
that leisure showed no secular trend despite growing wages. This can only be accounted for
when the elasticity of substitution between leisure and consumption is close to one.
We do not introduce pollution into the utility, because our objective is not to derive the best
policy, but rather to show the side eects of a given type of policy, the one that consists in
taxing pollution. Adding a disutility term such as −v(S) to the utility would not change
any of our results as long as utility is additively separable.
Future human capital is obtained through spending on education, et. Human capital pro-
duction function is:
kt+1 = τe
η
t k
ν
t (1)
with the following parametric restrictions: τ ∈ R+, ν, η ∈ (0, 1). We assume moreover that
η + ν < 1, which will imply that human capital and output per person will converge in
the long-run to a constant level.
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Parameter τ is a measure of productivity of education
technology. Parameter η is the elasticity of human capital kt+1 to investment et. Parameter
ν captures the strength of an externality from parents human capital to children human
capital.It represents the usual parental inuence on children outcome. This production
function is very standard in the literature on education, starting with Glomm and Ravikumar
(1992).
6
The alternative case η+ ν = 1 would generate endogenous growth, which could be analyzed as well with
the tools developed here.
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Let us provide a few additional details on the parameters η and ν. η measures the elasticity
of earnings with respect to schooling. An idea of its magnitude can be obtained from the
survey by Krueger and Lindahl (2001) which reports estimates of the return to schooling
in developed countries of 8-10 percent, with higher estimates for developing countries and
low levels of schooling. Assuming that an additional year of schooling raises education
expenditure by 20 percent, these returns translate into an earnings elasticity of schooling
between 0.4 and 0.8. Replacing kt+1 in the utility function by its expression from (1), allows
to stress the importance of the parameter η:
ln(ct) + ϕ ln `t + γ(ln(nt) + η ln(et)) + γν ln kt + γτ
The last two terms of the sum are constant. We see that η is not only the elasticity of
human capital to education spending in (1), but also the relative weight of quality in the
utility function. It has to be smaller than 1 because the parents' optimization problem would
otherwise not have a solution. More specically, utility would approach innity as parents
choose arbitrarily high levels of quality spending et and arbitrarily low levels of fertility (a
similar condition can be found in Moav (2005) and de la Croix and Doepke (2009)).
The parameter ν captures the intergenerational transmission of ability, as well as human cap-
ital formation within the family that does not work through formal schooling (et). Empirical
studies detect such eects, but they are relatively small.
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Producing x children requires time Tt and space L/Nt (land per household), with the follow-
ing technology:
x = µ
(
L
Nt
)α
Tt
Compared to the models developed in the recent literature, we introduce land per person
as an input in the child production technology. The aim is to take into account that, when
households have small dwellings, child production is more costly and people have fewer
children (this is known since Goodsell (1937) and Thompson (1938)). It also implies that
population will be stationary in the long-run. Indeed, as population increase, it becomes more
and more costly to have children, lowering progressively the fertility rate to its replacement
level. Parameter µ measures total factor productivity of the procreation activity. Parameter
α ∈ (0, 1) captures the importance of space to produce children. The time needed to produce
nt children is given by:
1
µ
(
Nt
L
)α
nt = φN
α
t nt,
7
For example, Leibowitz (1974) nds that, after controlling for education, parental income has a signicant
eect on a child's earnings. The elasticity is of the order of 0.1.
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with
φ =
1
µ
(
1
L
)α
.
Households face a budget constraint stating that consumption plus education spending can-
not exceed income yt:
ct + ntet ≤ yt. (2)
Households have a total time endowment equal to 1. They face a time constraint, expressing
that time spent working ht, rearing children and having leisure should not exceed 1.
ht + φN
α
t nt + `t ≤ 1 (3)
Households are self-employed. The productivity of each hour of work is given by the quality
of the worker, i.e. his/her human capital kt. Total production is therefore the product of
hours of work ht and kt:
yt ≤ htkt (4)
Notice that, in this production function, we assume constant returns with respect to input of
eciency units htkt. We also consider hours of work and eciency units a perfect substitutes:
doubling eciency together with halving hours of work would leave production unchanged.
Departing from one of these two assumptions is not expected to modify the results. However,
it would make the analysis more complex, requiring to rely on numerical analysis in most
cases.
Replacing the saturated constraints (2), (3) and (4) into the objective, the households max-
imization problem can be written as:
max
`t,nt,et
ln((1− `t − φnt)kt − ntet) + ϕ ln `t + γ(ln(nt) + η ln(et)) + constant terms
The rst order conditions are:
−kt
(1− `t − φnt)kt − ntet
+
ϕ
`t
= 0
−φkt − et
(1− `t − φnt)kt − ntet
+
γ
nt
= 0
−nt
(1− `t − φnt)kt − ntet
+
γη
et
= 0
As the maximization problem is convex, the rst-order conditions are necessary and sucient
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for a maximum. Solving the set of rst order conditions and saturated constraints (2)-(3)-(4)
for ct, `t, nt, et, and yt yields closed form solutions:
ct =
kt
1 + ϕ+ γ
(5)
`t =
ϕ
1 + ϕ+ γ
(6)
nt =
γ(1− η)
(1 + ϕ+ γ)φNαt
(7)
et =
ηφNαt kt
1− η
(8)
yt =
γη
1 + ϕ+ γ
kt (9)
2.3 Aggregate Dynamics
Adult population dynamics are given by:
Nt+1 = Ntnt (10)
Replacing the expressions for et (8) and nt (7) into the equations describing the dynamics
of human capital (1) and population (10) leads to:
kt+1 = τ
(
ηϕ
1− η
)η
Nηαt k
ν+η
t (11)
Nt+1 =
γ(1− η)
(1 + ϕ+ γ)φ
N1−αt (12)
This system is recursive as the second equation can be solved independently of the rst one.
The second equation shows that Nt+1 is an increasing and concave function of Nt which does
not depend on kt. It has a unique non trivial steady state
N¯ =
(
γ(1− η)
(1 + ϕ+ γ)φ
) 1
α
(13)
which is globally stable. Dynamics of population are monotonic. For a given Nt, the rst
equation also describes an increasing and concave relation between kt+1 and kt. When Nt is
close enough to N¯ , the dynamics of kt are also monotonic and converge to:
k¯ =
(
τ 1/η γη
1 + ϕ+ γ
) η
1−ν−η
for α > 0
10
Income per capita converges to
y¯ = τ
1
1−νη
(
γη
1 + ϕ+ γ
) 1−νη+η
1−νη
A larger country (higher L, lower φ) will have a larger population size. A more productive
country (higher τ) will have higher income per capita.
If α = 0, space is not useful to produce children. Population grows unboundedly at rate
γ(1− η)/((1 + ϕ+ γ)φ) and human capital converges to:
k¯ =
(
τ 1/η ηϕ
1− η
) η
1−νη
for α = 0
3 Regulation: Pollution Cap and Tradable Rights
At each date, past pollution is given. A given pollution target S?t can be achieved by imposing
an emission target E?t such that:
S?t = Ψ(S
?
t−1, E
?
t ), ∀t ∈ N.
Since we do not provide, in this paper, a utility based justication for a given pollution target,
the latter is taken to be exogenous. As a result, the path of emission targets {E?t }t=0..+∞ is
exogenous too.
Remember that, for simplication purposes, we have assumed that the output is produced by
self-employed households. To meet the sequence of emission targets, two policy schemes are
available and interchangeable. First, a Pigovian tax on emissions, hence on production, the
revenue of which is transferred back to households in a lump-sum way. Second, a tradable
pollution rights system with a free initial allocation of rights to households. In a world where
agents behave competitively and information is perfect about both the objective that is being
pursued and the deep parameters of the model, tradable quotas schemes and price-oriented
schemes are fully equivalent.
8
This implies that, despite our focus on tradable right schemes,
the results will be of direct relevance for those willing to implement a Pigovian tax.
8
Uncertainty (Weitzman 1974) or strategic interactions (Wirl 2011) draw a wedge between these two
instruments.
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3.1 Households
Tradable pollution rights systems, such as the Kyoto system, impose each household to buy
pollution rights in proportion to the output that would exceed their initial endowment. Let
us denote the price of the pollution right by pt and the initial endowment of rights by qt.
The budget constraint of the household is now:
yt ≥ ct + ntet + pt(atyt − qt) (14)
The constraint can be rewritten:
(1− atpt)yt + ptqt ≥ ct + ntet
which shows clearly that the price of pollution permits pt weighted by the pollution coecient
at acts like an income tax, and ptqt as a lump sum transfer.
Replacing the saturated constraints (1), (14), (3) and (4) into the objective, the households
maximization problem can be written as:
max
`t,nt,et
Lt = ln((1− atpt)(1− `t − φnt)kt − ntet + ptqt)
+ ϕ ln `t + γ(ln(nt) + η ln(et)) + constant terms
The rst order conditions can be written under the form marginal cost = marginal benet:
∂Lt
∂`t
= 0 ⇒
(1− atpt)kt
ct
=
ϕ
`t
∂Lt
∂nt
= 0 ⇒
(1− atpt)φkt − et
ct
=
γ
nt
∂Lt
∂et
= 0 ⇒
nt
ct
=
γη
et
The price pt aects the rst order conditions for `t and nt by lowering their marginal cost.
As the maximization problem is convex, the rst-order conditions are necessary and sucient
for a maximum. Solving the system formed by the rst-order conditions and the constraints
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leads to:
ct =
1
1 + ϕ+ γ
((1− atpt)kt + ptqt)
`t =
ϕ
1 + ϕ+ γ
(1− atpt)kt + ptqt
(1− atpt)kt
nt =
γ(1− η)
(1 + ϕ+ γ)φNαt
(1− atpt)kt + ptqt
(1− atpt)kt
(15)
et =
ηφNαt kt
1− η
(1− atpt) (16)
yt =
(1− atpt)kt(1 + γη)− (ϕ+ γ − γη)ptqt
(1− atpt)(1 + ϕ+ γ)
3.2 A Small Open Economy
Before considering our economy as a model of the world, hence in general equilibrium, we
analyze the case of a small open economy in which the price pt and the quota qt are imposed
from outside and exogenous.
We rst observe that the time spent on emission-free activities, i.e. leisure and procreation,
increases with the price of pollution permits pt. Indeed, pt acts as a tax on the time spent
on production. Hence, increases in pt lower the opportunity cost of leisure and procreation.
pt is similar to a subsidy to procreation:
∂`t
∂pt
> 0,
∂nt
∂pt
> 0
Leisure and procreation also increase with the endowment of pollution permits. This is
because they are both normal goods:
∂`t
∂qt
> 0,
∂nt
∂qt
> 0
Human capital accumulation (education) is reduced by the price of pollution permits, because
of a substitution of quantity (nt) for quality (kt+1) of children:
∂et
∂pt
< 0
Finally, net individual income and production are reduced by the price pt:
∂yt
∂pt
= −
(ϕ+ γ(1− η))qt
(1 − pt)2(1 + ϕ+ γ)
< 0.
13
Let us now analyze how the presence of tradable pollution rights aects the steady state
and the dynamics of a small open economy. For this, we assume exogenous variables to be
constant, i.e. at = a, pt = p and qt = q. The dynamics are represented as follows:
kt+1 = τ
(
ηϕ
1− η
)η
Nηαt k
ν+η
t (1− ap)
η
Nt+1 =
γ(1− η)
(1 + ϕ+ γ)φ
N1−αt
(1− ap)kt + pq
(1− ap)kt
This dynamical system is no longer block recursive, i.e. the two dierence equations need
to be solved simultaneously. To analyze its properties, we can draw the phase diagram of
Figure 3. A rst phase line is given by
∆kt+1 = 0⇔ kt+1 − kt = τ
(
ηϕ
1− η
)η
Nηαt k
ν+η
t (1− ap)
η − kt = 0. (17)
Solving for Nt gives
Nt = τ
−1
ηα
(
ηϕ
1− η
)−1
α
(1− ap)
−1
α k
1−ν−η
ηα
t . (18)
The right hand side is an increasing function of kt. We draw this function in the space
{kt, Nt}. Considering a point located above that line, i.e. a point with a larger Nt than the
one given by (18), it appears from (17) that it corresponds to a situation where ∆kt+1 > 0.
Accordingly, when located above this phaseline, we draw a horizontal arrow oriented to the
right to indicate the direction of motion. Another arrow oriented to the left is drawn when
below then phaseline.
The second phase line is given by
∆Nt+1 = 0⇔ Nt+1 −Nt =
γ(1− η)
(1 + ϕ+ γ)φ
N1−αt
(1− ap)kt + pq
(1− ap)kt
−Nt = 0 (19)
Solving for Nt gives
Nt =
[
γ(1− η)
(1 + ϕ+ γ)φ
(1− ap)kt + pq
(1− ap)kt
] 1
α
(20)
which is a negatively sloped function going from +∞ when kt = 0 to 0 when kt = +∞. Let
us decrease kt to consider a point to the left of this curve. It increases the function (19) and
hence ∆Nt+1 > 0 in this zone. Hence, to the left (resp. right) of this curve, we can draw
arrows pointing upward (resp. downward).
The phase diagram in the left panel of Figure 3 shows that there is inevitably a unique
steady state with oscillatory dynamics. Appendix A linearizes the dynamic system around
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∆kt+1 = 0∆Nt+1 = 0
Nt
kt
Nt
kt
increase in p
Figure 3: Phase diagram for a small open economy
the steady state and shows that the steady state is locally stable.
Let us now suppose that there is an exogenous increase in the price of pollution permits.
Dierentiating the two phase lines (18) and (20) leads us to conclude that they both shift
upward. As a consequence, the new steady state has a higher population level. We have
seen above that pollution control was increasing fertility. This translates at the steady state
level into a larger population.
3.3 General Equilibrium
We now turn our attention to the most dicult case: the one in which the price of pollution
rights, instead of being exogenous, adjust as a function of market forces. The equilibrium on
the market for tradable pollution rights implies that total pollution Ntatyt equals the total
number of quotas Ntqt, unless the price pt is nil:
pt(Ntatyt −Ntqt) = 0.
Two cases may arise depending on whether the cap is binding or not. A cap is binding if it
is set lower than the otherwise desired total amount of pollution. This occurs when
qt < atyt
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where yt is computed in the business as usual scenario. Replacing yt by its value from
Equation (9) leads to:
qt < at
1 + γη
1 + ϕ+ γ
kt (21)
Proposition 1 At time t, the equilibrium satises:
If (21) holds then pt =
kt(1 + γη)− qt(1 + ϕ+ γ)
(kt − qt)(1 + γη)
(22)
yt =
qt
at
If (21) does not hold then pt = 0
yt =
γη
1 + ϕ + γ
kt
qt
If the pollution endowment is suciently restrictive, there will be a positive price of pollution
permits and production will match the target. If the pollution quota is large, the policy is
non binding. The price of permits then falls to zero, and the output corresponds with the
one of the business as usual scenario.
3.4 Dynamics
Let us consider a constant emission cap E?. As a consequence, the pollution endowment per
household will be:
qt =
E?
Nt
We now analyze how dierent levels of the emission cap E? aect the dynamics of population
Nt. To simplify, we keep technical progress constant at = 1 (but of course we will not use
this simplication when we will let at increase in one of our scenarii).
The dynamics of human capital kt and population Nt are obtained by replacing et, nt, and
pt from (16), (15) and (22) into (1) and (10):
kt+1 = τk
ν
t
(
ηφNαt kt
1− η
(
1−
kt(1 + γη)− qt(1 + ϕ+ γ)
(kt − qt)(1 + γη)
))η
Nt+1 = Nt
(
γ(1− η)
(1 + ϕ+ γ)φNαt
(
1 +
kt(1+γη)−qt(1+ϕ+γ)
(kt−qt)(1+γη)
1− kt(1+γη)−qt(1+ϕ+γ)
(kt−qt)(1+γη)
qt
kt
))
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Using qt = E
?/Nt and simplifying leads to:
kt+1 = τk
ν+η
t
(
ηφNαt E
?(ϕ+ γ − γη)
(Ntkt − E?)(1− η)(1 + γη)
)η
Nt+1 =
γ(1− η)(Ntkt −E
?)
φNαt kt(ϕ+ γ − γη)
The analysis of these dynamics is detailed in Appendix B. The main result is the following.
Proposition 2 (Population and the pollution cap)
For a suciently stringent pollution cap E?, there is a locally stable steady state population,
decreasing in E?.
If E? is restrictive enough, the long-run population N¯ is higher if the pollution cap is set at
a more stringent level. As a consequence, income per capita will unambiguously be lower,
as y = E?/N .
From the dynamic point of view, the pro-population tilt of pollution caps is worrying. For
a given E?, emission endowments per person inevitably become more and more stringent
as generations pass. Because of this pro natalist eect, capping emissions impoverishes the
successive generations more than in a conventional set-up with exogenous fertility. It is worth
spelling out why capping emissions tends to reduce production rather than procreation. This
is the case because production generates emissions from the moment it takes place onwards,
whereas procreation rather generates delayed emissions. This rests on two assumptions.
First only physical good production generates pollution. Second, children do not consume
physical goods. This implies that the emissions of a person take place at adulthood. In
a more general set-up, it would be sucient to assume that procreation and leisure are
simply less emission-intensive activities than production. This is why capping emissions at
period t puts less pressure on procreation than on production. In a way, if procreation only
generates emissions through future production (i.e. when children will themselves become
producers), the capping scheme generates a specic form of externality. Current adults
willing to procreate at a rate higher than the replacement rate do not internalize the fact
that tomorrow's pollution cap will have to be divided into smaller pollution endowments.
4 Numerical Experiment
In order to provide a meaningful example of the mechanisms studied analytically above, we
calibrate the parameters of the model and we simulate the eect of introducing pollution
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caps on the dynamics of income and population.
4.1 Calibration
Assume that each period lasts 25 years. We will use the year 1983 as representing t = 0
(initial conditions), and the year 2008 as t = 1. 2008 is the last year for which we have
observations.
We rst identify γ, ϕ, η, ν and α with the following ve restrictions:
1. The share of consumption in GDP is 80% (corresponds to public and private consump-
tions of the national accounts). Using Equations (5) and (9), we nd that
ct
yt
=
1
1 + γη
= 0.8
2. the time spent on leisure (`t) and procreation (φN¯
α
) amounts to 2/3 of total avail-
able time (this has become a standard value in the literature since Ghez and Becker
(1975) found that households allocate approximately one-third of their time to market
activities). Using (13):
φN¯α =
γ(1− η)
1 + ϕ+ γ
From (6):
`t + φN¯
α =
ϕ
1 + ϕ+ γ
+
γ(1− η)
1 + ϕ+ γ
=
ϕ+ γ(1− η)
1 + ϕ+ γ
=
2
3
3. At steady state, the time spent rearing children is equal to 15% (see de la Croix and
Doepke (2003)) of the time remaining after leisure had been accounted for:
φNα
1− `t
= 0.15
This implies
γ(1− η)
1 + γ
= 0.15
4. Following the literature on conditional convergence (see Abreu, de Groot, and Florax
(2005) for a survey), the convergence speed of income per capita is 2% per year. For
the dynamic equation (11) we get
kt+1
kt
=
(
kt
kt−1
)ν+η (
Nt
Nt−1
)αη
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The required convergence speed is obtained with ν + η = 0.9825.
5. The dynamics of population are calibrated to match the forecasted evolution of world
population between 2008 (t−1), 2033 (t) and 2058 (t+1). From the dynamic equation
(12) we get
Nt+1
Nt
=
(
Nt
Nt−1
)1−α
and we have Nt−1 = 6.67, Nt = 8.18 and Nt+1 = 8.88 from the 2007 IIASA World
Population Projection.
Solving this system gives γ = 0.470588, ϕ = 2.27941, η = 0.53125, ν = 0.0722147, and
α = 0.5976. Notice that η is in line with estimates of the return from education (see the
discussion in de la Croix and Doepke (2003)). Moreover, this η is almost enough to obtain the
required speed of convergence of income per capita, as the additional parameter ν is small.
Notice nally that the parameter α implies an annual convergence speed for population of
3.56% per year.
The two productivity levels, τ and φ, are parameters that determine the size of population
and income per capita. Imposing initial conditions so as to start in 1983 requires N0 = 4.68
and y0 = 4.541. Inverting (9) gives us k0 = 16.0271. In order to obtain the right levels
N1 = 6.67 and y1 = 7.614 in 2008, we need to have φ = 0.0164 and τ = 24.0417.
4.2 Simulation
Table 1 provides the simulation from 1983 (initial conditions) to 2208 when no pollution cap
is imposed. It illustrates the properties of the benchmark model: monotonic convergence of
population, which tends to 8.47 billions, and income per capita (38155 dollars per capita per
year in 2208). Fertility declines rapidly to its replacement level. Leisure is constant.
Let us now impose a constant pollution cap:
E? = 100,
starting to bind in 2033 (one should read the 25 years period surrounding 2033). The chosen
level of E? is arbitrary and for illustration purposes only. Table 2 provides the results. There
is now one new column: the pollution price pt. The price in 2033 is 0.24, corresponding to an
implicit tax of 24% on production. Following the tax, total output Yt is indeed limited to 100.
As a consequence of this tax, the households retreat from market activities to devote more
time to leisure (66.1% instead of 60.8% in the benchmark) and to procreation (1.151 child
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t Nt nt `t yt Yt
1983 4.680 1.425 0.608 5.342 25.002
2008 6.670 1.153 0.608 9.769 65.164
2033 7.692 1.059 0.608 15.737 121.052
2058 8.146 1.023 0.608 21.954 178.847
2083 8.336 1.009 0.608 27.334 227.862
2108 8.414 1.004 0.608 31.428 264.432
2133 8.445 1.002 0.608 34.290 289.596
2158 8.458 1.001 0.608 36.185 306.058
2183 8.463 1.000 0.608 37.397 316.498
2208 8.465 1.000 0.608 38.155 322.992
Table 1: Benchmark Simulation - World Economy 1983-2208
t Nt pt nt `t yt Yt
1983 4.680 0.000 1.425 0.608 5.342 25.002
2008 6.670 0.000 1.153 0.608 9.769 65.164
2033 7.692 0.240 1.151 0.661 13.000 100.000
2058 8.855 0.505 1.171 0.731 11.294 100.000
2083 10.366 0.556 1.087 0.746 9.647 100.000
2108 11.272 0.574 1.042 0.752 8.871 100.000
2133 11.746 0.582 1.020 0.754 8.513 100.000
2158 11.982 0.586 1.010 0.755 8.346 100.000
2183 12.097 0.587 1.005 0.756 8.266 100.000
2208 12.153 0.588 1.002 0.756 8.229 100.000
Table 2: Simulation with a Constant Pollution Cap - 1983-2208
t Nt pt nt `t yt Yt
1983 4.680 0.000 1.425 0.608 5.342 25.002
2008 6.670 0.000 1.153 0.608 9.769 65.164
2033 7.692 0.240 1.151 0.661 13.000 100.000
2058 8.855 0.318 1.089 0.680 14.483 128.243
2083 9.641 0.256 1.012 0.665 17.058 164.463
2108 9.755 0.140 0.964 0.638 21.622 210.913
2133 9.402 0.000 0.939 0.608 28.167 264.830
2158 8.831 0.000 0.975 0.608 33.249 293.627
2183 8.611 0.000 0.990 0.608 36.025 310.229
2208 8.525 0.000 0.996 0.608 37.511 319.761
Table 3: Simulation with technical progress - 1983-2208
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Figure 4: Delay in the Demographic Transition
per person instead of 1.059 in the benchmark, to be multiplied by 2 to compare to fertility
rates per women). The rise in procreation does not look big, but it is large enough to have
immense consequences for the future, through its cumulative eect over time. Population in
2058 is now 8.85 billions instead of 8.15 billions in the benchmark and converges in the long
run to more than 12 billions instead of 8.5 billions in the benchmark.
Another way to look at the same data is to plot fertility over time. Figure 4 represents
children born per person over time, for the benchmark (black line) and the constant cap
(grey line) scenarii. The drop is fertility is delayed by two periods when the pollution cap
is imposed. Notice that delaying the demographic transition does not entail reversing the
general trend towards fertility drop. This matters for the following reason. Data tend to
show that countries having gone through their demographic transition do not experience
later on a rise in fertility in episodes of impoverishment (see e.g. Moldova). This could
suggest that the demographic transition is irreversible. Even if we were to accept this idea,
this would not conict with the delaying eect we identied.
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Suppose now that there is some technical progress making production more and more clean
over time. Precisely, we assume that
at = (1.01)
−25(t−2),
which reects a technical progress of 1% per year. t is equal to 2 in 2033, this formulation is
the same as previously for the year 2033, but output is becoming less and less polluting as
time passes. Hence we can allow increasing caps: E?2033 = 100, E
?
2058 = 128.243 etc. Table
3 provides the results. In the long-run, the cap is not binding thanks to technical progress,
and the economy converges to the benchmark steady state. As population has risen fast
in the beginning, it actually overshoot its long run level, and converges from above to its
steady state. The cost of this policy in terms of income are still very large. For example,
income per person would be 17058 dollars per year in 2083 with the cap, and 27334 in the
benchmark.
Figure 5 summarizes the result, comparing the benchmark, the constant pollution cap, and
the increasing cap simulations on the gure used in the introduction to present the iso-
pollution curve. The benchmark follows a convex path in this plane, and crosses the iso-
pollution line E? = 100 early on. The constant cap path, on the contrary, moves South-East
as soon as the cap is binding. It will converge to a situation with a large population and
an income per capita only slightly above the 1983 level. The increasing cap path is an
intermediate case. In the short-run (which means here a few generations), it follows the
constant cap path, with lower income per person and higher population. In the long-run
though, the path converges to the benchmark steady state.
In future research, it would be interesting to consider a policy under which we cap population
rather than emissions, for example along the lines proposed by de la Croix and Gosseries
(2009). Tradable procreation quotas schemes are of course not the only available option.
Policies aimed at addressing population issues - both in terms of absolute level and of het-
erogeneity - are notoriously dicult to design. If they aim at keeping population below a
certain level, they should remain as freedom-friendly as possible while being simultaneously
concerned with not increasing poverty and inequality. Women education is a policy that can
be justied independently (e.g. on gender equality grounds) while being eective at reduc-
ing birth rate without increasing poverty nor infringing too much on procreative freedom.
Other tools have been discussed in the literature, such as taxing skilled people to subsidize
unskilled ones ready to limit themselves to a single child (Fan and Stark (2008)).
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to explore the respective merits of such population
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Figure 5: Income and Population Dynamics in the Examples
control policies in detail, it would of course be crucial to consider which one to adopt in
conjunction with measures of pollution control. Alternatively, a population control policy
could also work as a substitute to a directly environmental one. A key question is the
following: is there a population cap N? such that the desired emission level E? could be
met? If yes, does N? allow for higher income per capita than under the model capping
emissions directly? If the answer to these two questions is positive, the next question will
become: under which conditions does it follow that we should cap population rather than
emissions?
5 Conclusion
Pollution control, and especially greenhouse gas emission reduction, are matters of great im-
portance. Most of the literature looks at environmental policy considering that demography
is exogenous (see e.g. the two inuential papers by Howarth (1998) and Gerlagh and van der
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Zwaan (2001) using OLG models). However, we have shown that such policies unexpectedly
impact on the population dynamics through a production-procreation substitution eect.
Capping pollution subsidies de facto procreation, and may therefore delay the demographic
transition in developing countries and the drop in global fertility. Such an increase in pop-
ulation, compared with a business as usual scenario, may in turn be damaging either in
environmental terms if the pollution scheme is ineective, or in terms of average standard
of living - both independently and through the operation of the pollution cap at the next
period.
Admittedly, the eect of pollution on utility and/or on productivity has not been modeled.
If pollution aects productivity negatively,
9
or has a negative eect on the health of workers,
the strength of our substitution eect would be weakened. Assuming that consumption and
environment quality are complements in the utility function would also weaken our results.
Rening the model in that direction would denitely be of interest for a welfare assessment of
environmental policies. However, it would not aect the specic conclusion of this paper, as
these extensions are unlikely to reverse the direction of the substitution eect we highlighted.
Moreover, we assumed that households do not care about future generations beyond their
own children. This is not an unusual assumption as some degree of diminishing altruistic
behavior seems realistic. Finally, we have considered technological progress to be exogenous.
This does not put into question the fact that capping pollution has an impact on population,
and even a signicant one as we have shown, even if technological progress were endogenous.
We need to make sure as much as possible that pollution control does not take place at the
costs of the current least well o or at the cost of those in the future. The natalist bias we
identied is worrying in the latter respect. One may then want to address it in two main
ways. As was suggested in the introduction, one could adopt an allocation rule of pollution
endowments relying on some form of emission grandfathering. It would be such that those
deciding to increase their population would not receive extra emission quotas at the next
period. Besides the fairness concerns that this would raise, it may however not be enough
to mitigate the substitution eect to a signicant degree. Alternatively, population could
be capped directly through a separate scheme, be it in the absence of or as a complement
of the pollution capping scheme. Further research is needed to assess the impact of using
population and pollution capping schemes either alternatively or complementarily.
10
9
One possibility would be for example to model the impact of emissions on agricultural productivity
through average temperature increase.
10
Another possible extension of the model would consist in adding income heterogeneity among households
within generations. This would allow us to study the distributive impact of the substitution eect.
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A Dynamics in the Small Open Economy
The dynamics to characterize are given by:
kt+1 = τ
(
ηϕ
1− η
)η
Nηαt k
ν+η
t (1− ap)
η
Nt+1 =
γ(1− η)
(1 + ϕ+ γ)φ
N1−αt
(1− ap)kt + pq
(1− ap)kt
Linearizing the dynamic system around the steady state (k¯, N¯) and using the steady state
relationships leads to the following Jacobian matrix:

 η + ν pqαγη(1−η)N¯(p−1)(γ(1−η)−N¯α(γ+ϕ+1)φ)
N¯1−α(p−1)(γ(1−η)−N¯α(γ+ϕ+1)φ)
2
pqγ(γ+ϕ+1)(1−η)φ
1− α


The determinant of this matrix is:
−
αγη(1− η)N¯−α
(1 + γ + ϕ)φ
+ η − αν + ν
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It is smaller than one and increasing in N¯ . We need to show that it is larger than −1 to
establish local stability. For a steady state not too far from the one in the benchmark model
(
γ(1− η)
(1 + ϕ + γ)φ
) 1
α
(Equation 13), the determinant is:
−αη + η − αν + ν = (η + ν)(1− α) ∈ (0, 1)
Hence, for a larger value of steady state population, the determinant is also ∈ (0, 1).
The trace of the Jacobian matrix is:
1− α + η + ν ∈ (0, 2)
Hence, the two eigenvalues are positive and smaller than one, and the steady state is locally
stable.
B Dynamics in the Global Economy
The dynamics to characterize are given by:
kt+1 = τk
ν+η
t
(
ηφNαt E
?(ϕ+ γ − γη)
(Ntkt − E?)(1− η)(1 + γη)
)η
Nt+1 =
γ(1− η)(Ntkt −E
?)
φNαt kt(ϕ+ γ − γη)
To analyze these dynamics let us rst look for steady states. Solving the last equation for k
at steady state leads to:
k¯ =
γ(1− η)E?/N
γ(1− η)− φNα(ϕ+ γ − γη)
Replacing kt+1 and kt by this value in the rst dynamic equation, we nd:
τ
(
N¯
E?
)1−ν−η (
γη
1 + γη
)η
=
(
γ(1− η)
γ(1− η)− φN¯α(γ + ϕ− γη)
)1−ν
(23)
This equation cannot be solved explicitly for N¯ . Let us rewrite this equality as
Ψ1(E
?, N¯) = Ψ2(N¯)
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Ψ2(N¯)
Ψ1(E
?, N¯)
Ψ1(E˜, N¯)
N¯
NˆN˜
1
Figure 6: Steady State Population with Pollution Cap
Figure 6 represents these two functions. The left hand side Ψ1 is an increasing and concave
function of N¯ , starting from 0 when N¯ = 0 and going to innity as N¯ →∞. The right hand
side Ψ2 is an increasing and convex function of N¯ , starting from 1 when N¯ = 0 and going
to innity as N¯ → Nˆ (vertical asymptote), with
Nˆ =
(
γ(1− η)
φ(γ + ϕ− γη)
)1/α
Hence, given the characteristics of the two functions, there are either two, one or no steady
state, depending on the stringency of the cap E?.
We can show that, when the cap E? is set at its most stringent and yet non binding level,
i.e. such that p = 0 and y = q, the steady state is unique. Indeed, in that case,
E = Nk
1 + γη
1 + ϕ+ γ
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Equation (23) would be, in that case,
τ
(
1 + ϕ+ γ
1 + γη
(
τ 1/η γη
1 + ϕ+ γ
) −η
1−ν−η
)1−ν−η (
γη
1 + γη
)η
=
(
γ(1− η)
γ(1− η)− φN¯α(γ + ϕ− γη)
)1−ν
which simplies into
1 + ϕ+ γ
1 + γη
=
γ(1− η)
γ(1− η)− φN¯α(γ + ϕ− γη)
and
N¯ =
(
γ(1− η)
(1 + ϕ+ γ)φ
) 1
α
≡ N˜
is the only solution to this equality. N¯ and k¯ take their value as in the benchmark model
without pollution cap.
Making the pollution cap E? marginally more stringent shifts the Ψ1 function upward. As
a result, for any binding pollution cap, we end up with two possible steady state equilibria,
respectively one with a larger population than N˜ and one with a smaller. A further step is
needed to identify a stable steady state and demonstrate the pro-natalist eect of lowering
E?.
Linearizing the dynamic system around the steady state leads to the following Jacobian
matrix: 
 η + ν −
γη(1−η)
(ϕ+γ−ηγ)φN¯α
−
E?γη(1−η)(γ(1−η)−α(ϕ+γ−ηγ)φN¯α)
N¯2(ϕ+γ−ηγ)φN¯α((ϕ+γ−ηγ)φN¯α+γ(1−η))
N¯2(γ(1−η)−(ϕ+γ−ηγ)φN¯α)
2
E?γ(ϕ+γ−ηγ)(1−η)φN¯α
γ(1−η)
(ϕ+γ−ηγ)φN¯α
− α


The determinant of this matrix is:
γ(1− η)ν
(ϕ+ γ − ηγ)φN¯α
− αν
It is decreasing in N¯ . Its trace is:
γ(1− η)2
(ϕ+ γ − ηγ)φN¯α
− α + η + ν
also decreasing in N¯ .
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For the steady state close to Nˆ , the determinant has a value close to ν(1 − α) and a trace
close to 1− α + ν. It is is therefore locally stable.
If E? is restrictive enough, the low population steady state has a population close to zero, and
the high population steady state has a population close to the value of the vertical asymptote
Nˆ . The low population steady state is increasing in E?, the high population steady state,
which is locally stable, is decreasing in E?. The latter result proves Proposition 2.
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